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From 1972 to 1980, a ferocious war raged throughout
the southern Philippines between Muslim separatist
rebels and the Philippine military. An estimated
120,000 people died in the fighting, which also created
one million internal refugees and caused more than
100,000 Philippine Muslims to flee to Malaysia. That
war ended in a stalemate and for the next 18 years an
uneasy and fragile cease-fire existed Ð one periodically
broken by armed clashes between the military and sep-
aratist fighters who remain under arms in remote
camps. A 1996 peace agreement between the Philip-
pine government and the main rebel faction represents
the first real progress towards a genuine settlement of
the conflict and substantial political autonomy for
Philippine Muslims. This article traces the remote and
proximate causes of the Philippine Muslim (or
B a n g s a m o r o) rebellion and its consequences for ordi-
nary Muslims.
Armed Separatism
and Muslim
Autonomy in the
Southern Philippines
The Muslim territories of the Philippines mark
the periphery of the Eurasian Islamic world.
Indeed, with the exception of a few Muslim
groups in easternmost Indonesia, no indigenous
population of Muslims in the world lives at a far-
ther distance from the Islamic heartland than do
the Muslims of the Philippines. There are
approximately 3 million Muslims in the Philip-
pines, the only predominately Christian country
in Southeast Asia. Though they represent only
about 5 percent of the Philippine population,
Muslims are geographically concentrated in the
south of the country, and are distinguished from
Christian Filipinos not only by their profession of
Islam but also by their evasion of 300 years of
Spanish colonial domination. They thus com-
prise the largest un-hispanicized population in
the Philippines. At the same time, Philippine
Muslims have always been separated from one
another in this archipelagic nation by significant
linguistic and geographic distance. They are
divided into three major and ten minor ethno-
linguistic groups and dispersed across the
southern islands.
Philippine Muslims share their religious cul-
ture with the neighbouring majority Muslim
nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. They also
retain aspects of an indigenous pre-Islamic and
pre-colonial Philippine culture Ð expressed in
dress, music, political traditions and a rich array
of folk beliefs and practices Ð that are similar to
those found elsewhere in island Southeast Asia,
but are today almost entirely absent among
Christian Filipinos. Thus, while Philippine Chris-
tians and Muslims inhabit the same state and are
linked together by various attachments, a pro-
found cultural gulf created by historical circum-
stance separates them. 
That gulf is the outcome of two inter-linked
events: the conversion of some regions of the
Philippines to Islam, and the Spanish colonial
occupation of other regions shortly afterward.
Philippine Muslim tradition holds that Islam was
brought to the Philippines by a wandering
prince, the son of a Malay princess and an Arab
sharif, in the very early sixteenth century. Islam
may in fact have arrived somewhat earlier or
later but, whatever the date, it seems clear that
Islam was introduced to the Philippines as part
of the last phase of a conversion process that
swept across Southeast Asia from west to east
beginning in the late thirteenth century. It is also
well established that the Islamization process
was still under way when the Spaniards gained
their foothold in the northern Philippines in
1571, defeating the fledgling Sultanate of Mani-
la to do so. After consolidating control of the
northern tier of the Philippine islands, they
failed, despite repeated attempts, to subdue the
well-organized sultanates of the South.Little his-
torical evidence exists to support claims that the
southern sultanates mounted a sustained, uni-
fied Muslim resistance to Spanish aggression. As
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, sultanates just as
often fought with one another, sometimes forg-
ing temporary alliances with the Spaniards to do
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so. Nevertheless, the ability of southern sul-
tanates individually to withstand Spanish hege-
mony for more than 300 years is a testament to
their military and diplomatic prowess. 
With their Reconquista of Muslim Spain a
recent collective memory, the Spaniards
assigned to the unsubjugated Muslim peoples
of the southern sultanates the label previously
bestowed on their familiar Muslim enemies from
Mauritania: Moros (Moors). The term Moro was
applied categorically and pejoratively with scant
attention paid to linguistic or political distinc-
tions among various Moro societies. The Ameri-
can colonizers who succeeded the Spaniards
and eventually subdued Philippine Muslims in
the early twentieth century by means of over-
whelming force, continued the usage of the
term Moro even though it had become an epi-
thet used by Christian Filipinos to denote sav-
ages and pirates. In a bold piece of semantic
alchemy, Philippine Muslim nationalists during
the late 1960s appropriated the term Moro,
shook it free of its colonial and pejorative roots,
and transformed it into a positive symbol of col -
lective identity Ð one that denominated the citi-
zens of their newly-imagined nation. For Philip-
pine Muslim nationalists, Moro denotes the
descendants of those unsubjugated peoples
whom the Spaniards and their colonized sub-
jects feared and distrusted. The ÔMoro National
Liberation FrontÕ was formed to direct the strug-
gle for an independent political entity pro-
claimed to be the Bangsa Moro or Philippine
Muslim Nation.
The Rise of Muslim Nationalism
and the Armed Separatist
S t r u g g l e
The Bangsamoro rebellion developed out of a
political movement for Muslim separatism that
originated among a small set of Philippine Mus-
lim students and intellectuals in the late 1960s.
That movement had as its goal the establish-
ment of a single independent homeland for all
the Muslim peoples of the Philippines. The
remote causes of Muslim separatism in the mod-
ern Philippines may be traced to Western colo-
nizers. The Spaniards created two distinct popu-
lations in the archipelago Ð the colonized and
Christianized peoples of the North and the
unsubjugated and mostly Muslim peoples of the
South. American colonizers yoked those two
populations unevenly together in a colonial, and
then national, state. A more proximate cause
may be found in the policies and practices of the
postcolonial, Christian-dominated Philippine
State. Until the 1950s, Muslims formed the
majority population of almost every region of
the southern Philippines. In the early 1950s, the
Philippine government began to sponsor large-
scale migration from the poor and politically
troublesome regions of the north and central
parts of the country to the agricultural frontiers
of the sparsely populated southern islands. The
large, fertile, and under-populated island of Min-
danao became the primary destination for Chris-
tian migration to the southern Philippines and
by the late 1960s, Mindanao Muslims found
themselves a relatively impoverished minority in
their own homeland. 
Tensions brought about by massive Christian
migration to the Muslim South eventually led to
the eruption of sectarian violence in Mindanao
in 1970. That violence, which in many cases was
initiated or exacerbated by government soldiers,
was a primary justification used by President
Ferdinand Marcos to declare martial law in 1972.
One of the very first actions of the martial law
regime was an attempt to disarm Philippine
Muslims. In response, the underground Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) was activated
as an armed separatist movement. Muslim sepa-
ratist rebels, numbering as many as 30,000
armed insurgents, fought the Philippine Armed
Forces to a stalemate, obliging the Philippine
government to negotiate a cease-fire and peace
treaty in 1977. Muslim civilians overwhelmingly
supported the separatist insurgents and suf-
fered cruelly at the hands of the Philippine mili-
tary. The peace settlement, which called for the
establishment of a ÔMuslim Autonomous RegionÕ
in the southern Philippines, was never genuinely
implemented by the Marcos administration. As a
consequence, fighting broke out once more
before the end of 1977, but did not again
approach the level of intensity experienced prior
to the cease-fire. The Muslim separatist move-
ment entered a period of disarray marked by fac-
tional infighting and a weakening of popular
support. By the early 1980s, it had refashioned
itself in Mindanao into a mass-based and self-
consciously Islamic movement guided by Islam-
ic clerics. With the fall of the Marcos regime in
1985, movement leaders (with the now-modi-
fied aim of genuine political autonomy for
Philippine Muslims) fully adopted the practices
of popular politics, organizing mass demonstra-
tions to petition the government for political
autonomy. Meanwhile, armed rebel fighters
remained in fortified camps in the hills.
Moro Autonomy and
t h e Aspirations of
O r d i n a r y Muslims 
In 1996, seeking an end to more than 25 years
of political instability in the southern provinces,
the Philippine government finally signed and
implemented a new peace treaty with Nur Mis-
uari, the founder of the MNLF. Misuari became
governor of the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao, consisting of the four provinces in
the southern Philippines that retain Muslim
majorities. He also heads the Southern Philip-
pines Council for Peace and Development, a
three-year experimental body designed to chan-
nel development funds to all of the southern
Philippines and, in doing so, to convince majori-
ty Christian provinces to join the autonomous
region. Though many political uncertainties
remain, the Muslim Philippines today is more
peaceful than it has been in three decades and
exhibits more potential for prosperity than any-
one might have hoped for just a few years ago.
By the standards of modern ethno-nationalist
movements, the Moro struggle for self-determi -
nation has achieved considerable success. Origi-
nating as a largely defensive rebellion to protect
communities and cultural practices, the move-
ment has produced not only a significant mea-
sure of autonomy for Muslim leaders but also
some substantial new benefits for ordinary Mus-
lims. The rebellion drew the attention of the
Muslim world and strengthened connections to
the Islamic heartland long attenuated by physi-
cal distance and disrupted by Western colonial-
ism. One result has been an unprecedented flow
of external resources for Islamic education. New
institutions established by the separatist leader-
ship allowed Philippine Muslims for the first time
to register births and marriages with a formal
governmental authority they felt they could
trust. However, the most pressing need of ordi-
nary Muslims remains mostly unmet. As a result
of decades of governmental neglect and the
economic toll taken by the rebellion, the Muslim
provinces of the Philippines remain the very
poorest in the country. Without improving the
economic well-being of the majority of its citi-
zens, the autonomous government for which
ordinary Muslims fought and suffered will not
have rendered their struggles worthwhile. '
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